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ABSTRACT. Sartre’s discussion of «being-with-others» in Part Three of Being
and Nothingness is extraordinarily rich and highly original.  At its core, I
argue, lies an insight into the aporetic character of intersubjectivity – «the
scandal  of  the  plurality  of  consciousnesses»,  as  Sartre  puts  it  –  which
emerges most clearly in his critique of Hegel’s theory of intersubjectivity.
My aim in this paper is to isolate this thesis of Sartre’s and spell out his
grounds  for  it.  I  argue  furthermore  that  Hegel’s  conception  of
intersubjectivity corresponds to that of natural consciousness, such that,
in rejecting Hegel,  Sartre is  also impugning the reality of a  conception
integral to ordinary thought. I suggest that Sartre’s insight also holds the
key to his distinctive approach to social and political theory in the Critique
of Dialectical Reason.
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The history of philosophical reflection on intersubjectivity is a chiefly
post-Kantian affair, in which Sartre occupies a singular position. Sartre
is known for having characterized human relationships as irresolvably
conflictual in his early philosophical writings, while his literary works
from that period give forceful expression to an intensely pessimistic
vision  of  human relations,  according  to  which  love,  hatred,  sexual
desire,  and so on, are merely so many variations on a fundamental
dynamic, and all ultimately futile to an equal degree.
This  part  of  Sartre’s  account of intersubjectivity must  however be
distinguished, on my view, from his fundamental insight concerning
what may be called the transcendental logic of intersubjectivity – his
claim that  the condition of being with-and-among others cannot be
made rationally  transparent,  for  the reason that  intersubjectivity,  as
such and of itself, lacks the intelligibility and reality attributed to it in
ordinary thought, and in much philosophical theory. I describe this
claim as one of transcendental logic, though the term is not used by
Sartre  himself,  in  order  to  make  clear  that  it  is  not  an  instance  of
conceptual analysis, and nor does it belong straightforwardly to either
the epistemology of other minds or normative theory. Certainly it is
bound  up  with  and  has  bearing  on  these  more  familiar  areas  of
enquiry: Sartre articulates it in the context of a lengthy discussion of
the grounds of our knowledge of others, and it has implications for
how we should understand the problems of social and political life.
But the crux of Sartre’s position is a negative a priori claim concerning
the relation of the concept of intersubjectivity to its purported object.
The interest and importance of this insight has not, I think, been well
appreciated. In part this is due to the simple fact that Sartre’s position
is  at  variance with the firmly pro-intersubjectivist  consensus of  the
age,  but  it  also  owes  much  to  the  way in  which  Sartre  allows  his
argument to be construed as dependent on premises which are, critics
have  alleged,  naively  Cartesian  or  dogmatically  subjectivist.  My
primary aim in this paper is to show that, though the text of Being and
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Nothingness may admit  of  interpretations  which make controverting
his  position  a  simple  matter,  Sartre’s  doctrine  of  aporetic
intersubjectivity, once disentangled from its surroundings and pared
down to its essence, holds up under scrutiny and commands attention.
1. Sartre’s thesis
The historical originality to which I alluded lies in the challenge posed
by  Sartre  to  the  long  and  distinguished  philosophical  tradition,
beginning  in  classical  German  philosophy,  which  maintains  that  a
single arc of theoretical reflection can comprehend simultaneously (i)
self-conscious subjectivity in all of its interiority, and (ii) the essential
institutional,  ethical,  and  other  normative  structures  of  modern
sociality,  in  such a  way as  to  exhibit  their  rational  interconnection.
Sartre refers to this outlook, as he finds it in what he considers its fully
developed form, namely Hegel, as intersubjective «optimism». There is
no space here to rehearse the history in any detail, but I think it will be
agreed that this is a fair characterization of one important trajectory in
the post-Kantian development, and it will be helpful to have the major
landmarks in view.
The  basis  of  our  cognition  of  others  in  theoretical  and  practical
contexts  is  an  issue to  which Kant  pays scant  attention,  but  which
becomes abruptly central to the work of his successors, who evince a
deeper appreciation of Rousseau’s insight into the interdependence of
our self-conception and our conceptions of others – a relation which
they regard, furthermore, as opening up new philosophical avenues.
Schiller  in  the  Letters  on  Aesthetic  Education  addresses  on  a  broad
historical  plane  the  question  of  how  the  individual  might  hope  to
realize  the  reconfiguration  of  subjectivity  demanded  by  her  own
practical  reason  at  the  collective  level  of  aesthetically  informed
Bildung. Fichte in his later Jena writings advances the extraordinarily
original and powerful  idea that bare self-consciousness presupposes
(cognition  of)  its  own  recognition  by  another  self-consciousness.
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Schelling recasts this transcendental moment as a turning point in the
self-construction  of  consciousness,  which  makes  possible,  through
human history, the absolute unification of subjectivity and objectivity
or Freedom and Nature. Hegel, dissatisfied with Fichte’s solution on
various counts, including its alleged «one-sidedly» subjective character
and the sharp separation which it presupposes of transcendental from
empirical  levels  of  consideration,  reworks  Fichte’s  thesis  that
recognition is constitutive of self-consciousness in Chapter IV of the
Phenomenology of Spirit, in terms that, if Hegel is right, (a) dispose of
the  empty  formalism  implied  by  Fichte’s  treatment  of  the  I,  (b)
acknowledge  the  role  played  by  Nature  in  the  formation  of  self-
consciousness, and (c) facilitate the construction of a new ontology of
Geist, the fruits of which are seen in Hegel’s treatment of the human
sphere  at  large.  A  great  deal  of  later  philosophy,  from  the  Young
Hegelians, through Dewey, down to Habermas and Brandom in the
present day, follows Hegel’s path of expounding the social character of
human reason and the permeation of sociality by reason.
Sartre’s critique of this tradition, in all of its varieties, focuses, as I
have  said,  on  the  aporia  which  he  claims  to  find  at  the  root  of
intersubjectivity:  his  thesis,  in  preliminary  formulation,  is  that
intersubjective  consciousness  demands  a  doubling  of  standpoints,
between which we can alternate without strict inconsistency or overt
conceptual  incoherence,  but  which  resist  systematic  integration,  or
more exactly, which can be integrated only at a level of thought which
prescinds from one or other of the standpoints which it pretends to
synthesize.  The  upshot  is  that  intersubjectivity  involves  a  mere
superimposition of disjoined perspectives, sufficiently stable to allow for
the  conceptual  scheme  of  ordinary  psychology  and  the  pursuit  of
common forms of life, but which falls short of the unity required for
intersubjective structures to qualify as fully intelligible realities. Sartre
attempts to establish this result, moreover, by drawing on the native
resources of classical German philosophy.1
1 Indeed, Sartre’s model for the aporetic superimposition just described is the Unhappy
Consciousness of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (§§206-11/III:163-6). References to this
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Fichte has been credited by Dieter Henrich with an original insight
into  the  problem  posed  by  self-consciousness,2 and  my  parallel
suggestion regarding Sartre – that he offers a similarly ground-level
insight  concerning  the  interrelations  of  self-consciousnesses  (in
Sartre’s  memorable  phrase:  «the  scandal  of  the  plurality  of
consciousnesses»3)  –  is  intended to  follow Henrich’s  pattern  in  two
respects.  First,  the insight itself concerns the existence of an aporia,
and implies no positive theoretical claim. Sartre’s own account of our
knowledge of  other minds is  therefore not  strictly at issue.  Second,
elaborating  the  insight  involves  certain  steps  which  cannot  be
presented as  matters  of  immediate logical  implication,  and because
conceptual  analysis  cannot  directly  establish  Sartre’s  aporetic
conclusion, its demonstration needs to be indirect. Accordingly, I will
reconstruct his argument – with reference to his critical discussion of
Hegel  in  the  chapter  on  «The  Existence  of  Others»  in  Being  and
Nothingness, where the insight first gets articulated – in the form of a
dilemma for intersubjectivism.
It is characteristic of aporetic theses that they are elusive, and the
present case is no exception. At one extreme, Sartre may seem to be
saying something incontestable and anodyne – perhaps simply that
there  exists  no  collective  mind  in  the  same  sense  as  there  exist
individual minds; and at the other extreme, to be denying the basic
facts of interpersonal knowledge and social existence which define the
very phenomena he holds to be problematic. Getting his insight into
focus means arresting its  tendency to oscillate between trivial  truth
and inconsequential absurdity.4
Also to be acknowledged at the outset is  Sartre’s  openness to the
objection  that  his  whole  approach,  which  proceeds  at  a  level  of
work, prefixed PS, are first to the numbered paragraphs of the translation and then to
Phänomenologie des Geistes in Hegel’s Werke.
2 HENRICH 1982.
3 SARTRE 1995  [1943],  244/300,  henceforth  abbreviated  BN.  References  are  first  to  the
English translation and second to the original French edition of 1943.
4 Notable  treatments  in  the  commentaries  include  O’HAGAN 1981,  SCHROEDER 1984,
THEUNISSEN 1986, Ch. 6, and HONNETH 1995 and 2003.
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maximal abstraction and aims to grasp the very essence of the self-
other relation, fails to get purchase on any philosophically substantial
issue. If this is true, then Sartre is, as I have indicated, not on his own.
The  tradition  of  theorizing  in  which  Sartre  follows  supposes  that
abstraction  is  needed  precisely  in  order  to  exhibit  the  deep
intelligibility of intersubjectivity, by bringing to light a structure which
intermediates  between  various  spheres:  general  metaphysics,
knowledge of other minds and other-ascription of mental states, social
ontology, and normative ethical and political theory. If Sartre is right
that such intelligibility is missing, and if what this result should really
be taken to signify is that philosophers have been thinking about the
issue in entirely the wrong way, then that is a whole other story – with
wide repercussions,  since,  the next section will  argue, our ordinary
pre-philosophical  conception  of  intersubjectivity  appears  to  involve
equally a set of highly abstract commitments.
2. Commitments of natural consciousness
Before turning to Sartre’s text, I want to offer a characterization of our
pre-theoretical conception of intersubjectivity, which will allow us to
understand why so  much is  at  stake  in  Sartre’s  critique of  Hegel’s
intersubjectivism: because our ordinary conception of intersubjectivity
corresponds so closely to that of Hegel, critique of the latter implies a
critique of natural consciousness.5
Attempts  to  state  in  philosophically  neutral  terms  the  basic
constituents of intersubjectivity as natural consciousness conceives it,
are inevitably prey to the charge of tendentiousness, but the following
list  of  conditions  has  a  good claim to  capture  key elements  of  any
recognizable  modern  conception  of  intersubjectivity,  which  is  what
Sartre and Hegel are concerned to elucidate.
• It is a condition for a relation to qualify as intersubjective that
5 Sartre himself  does  not explicitly  make this  mapping,  but  it  is  clear  that  he regards
Hegel’s intersubjectivism as mirroring errors in natural consciousness. 
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it  should  allow  for  its  being  understood as  such  from  the
standpoint of the individual subjects which comprise its relata.
(Intersubjectivity,  like  selfhood,  is  necessarily  self-ascribable,
“I-/We-thinkable”.)
• Intersubjective relations presuppose that subjects have access –
if not explicitly or in fact, then implicitly or in principle – to a
universal under which they can jointly know themselves to fall.
(Whatever  determinate,  mutually  differentiating  conceptions
of self and other may be deployed in intersubjective relations,
all  parties  must  be  able  to  conceive  themselves  as  being  in
some essential respect, however indefinite, of a single kind.)
• Intersubjective  relations,  though  amply  creative  of  the
properties of subjects, do not ground but presuppose the basic
individuation of  their  relata.  (Our  fundamental  numerical
distinctness from one another is not something which could
have been  produced out of our relations to one another.6 This
independence is integral to our conception of intersubjectivity
as  a  domain which we do not  merely  act  on but  which we
participate in, in a sense that nature does not permit.)
• We find ourselves standing in relations to others somewhat as
we  find  ourselves  standing  in  relation  to  external  material
objects, in so far as our relations to particular others exhibit a
contingency which is necessarily absent from our self-relation.
(Self-relations  cannot  assume  the  same  richly  complex,
limitlessly  mediated forms as  our  relations  to others,  which
exploit, in a way that self-relations cannot, the separateness of
external bodies.)
• Nevertheless,  the  general circumstance  of  finding  oneself  in
relations  to  others,  though  not  given  as  deriving  from  any
prior and independent source, cannot be outright contingent.
(The natural facts of common species membership, biological
generation,  material  dependence  and  so  forth,  though
possessing a kind of necessity, are insufficient to explain the
6 Such that «it is by the very fact of being me that I exclude the Other» (BN 236/292).
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non-accidental  interlocking of  our  existences:  the manner  in
which  we  are  intentionally  contained  in  one  another,
«mutually imbricated»,7 in a way that things in nature cannot
be, and that our relation to nature cannot replicate.  Because
the  possibility  of  being  (so  to  speak)  inhabited  by  others
cannot be erased, we cannot take the distance from others that
we can from nature: solipsism, as distinct from mere isolation,
is phenomenologically inconceivable.)
• Intersubjectivity  encompasses  the  possibility  of  the  other’s
immediate,  apodictic  presence.  (Necessarily  it  is  possible  in
principle to look others in the eye, as we commonly put it: to
apprehend the other with certainty of being presented with a
subject of  predication,  a  bearer of  properties,  and not  merely
with a predicate.)
• The  possibility  of  being  determinately  related  to  another
subject presupposes a  common dimension, some homogeneous
medium  of  interrelation,  with  respect  to  which  we  find
ourselves interchangeable in principle, and by virtue of which
intersubjective  relations  have,  potentially  if  not  actually,  a
communicative character.8 (Whatever I can say or do to or with
you must be something that,  were our positions reversed in
appropriate respects, you could intelligibly say or do to or with
me. And what makes this the case – the plane on which we
meet and by virtue of which we are able to interact – must in
some sense pre-exist  our encounter,  i.e.,  cannot  be a simple
direct function of our conjunction.)
All of these conditions are ordinarily taken to be fulfilled in the simple
transactions  and communicative  acts  of  everyday life.  No puzzle  is
presented  when  one  person  employs  a  shared  natural  language  to
induce another to act in a certain way, social behaviour manifests the
unproblematic  interaction  of  beliefs  and  desires  across  individuals,
7 BN 236/292. The Other «penetrates me to the heart» (BN 237/293).
8 See BN 240/296 regarding the «common measure» and «homogeneity» of self and other.
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and  no  internal  subjective  dissonance  is  registered  by  default  in
quotidian intersubjective episodes; we do not seem to need to cross
any conceptual or metaphysical divide in order to make contact with
one another, and such exchanges do not typically induce an experience
of self-diremption. This capacity for immediate congruence, whereby
we find ourselves securely co-situated and enjoying equal reality on a
common plane, is most naturally taken to demonstrate the full reality
of  the  field  of  intersubjectivity,  and  speaks  loudly  in  favour  of
philosophical positions, such as Hegel’s, which affirm its full rational
reality.
If Sartre is right, reflection which takes the experiential coherence of
everyday intersubjective phenomenology – including, pre-eminently,
linguistic practice – as a guide to its ontological ground, allows itself to
be misled by appearances. The question is therefore: By what measure
of philosophically intelligibility could it be held that intersubjectivity
is not what it seems? Once again, if Sartre’s thought is to come into
focus, it is crucial that it be distinguished from more familiar claims. It
may be philosophically puzzling that a mind can have physical effects
which in turn can have mental effects, and that these sequences can
exhibit a causality of reason, or manifest freedom, and that we are able
to grasp others’ bodily behaviour as freighted with rich mental life,
and can comprehend an indexical with the peculiar properties of the
first-person pronoun. Equally it may be doubted that it is possible to
discover  universally  valid  norms  governing  the  relation  of  one
subject’s  will  to  that  of  another.  But  none  of  these  are  Sartre’s
fundamental concern. His target conclusion is not that theoretical or
practical solipsism is inescapable, i.e., that the problem of other minds
is insoluble or that human relations fail to admit of rational regulation.
The aporeticity of intersubjectivity, for Sartre, lies in the impossibility
of completing the picture projected by the various commitments listed
above:  they  cannot  all  be  followed  through  –  they  cannot  all  be
rationalized – without coming into collision.
To a degree this result should already seem half-way plausible, for
natural  consciousness’  commitments,  once  spelled out,  are revealed
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neither to be individually self-explanatory and self-justifying, nor to
explain and justify one another. Indeed it is not even clear that they are
consistent,  in  so  far  they  appear  to  presuppose  (i)  a  form  of
consciousness  which extends  beyond selfhood yet  somehow avoids
terminating in mere objectivity, and, in addition, (ii) the possibility of
an  essential  unity  inseparable  from  its  constituents,  which  are
nonetheless  able  to  grasp  themselves  independently:  natural
consciousness appears to envisage intersubjectivity as both a purely
relational structure, and a relation-facilitating reality in its own right,
and to conceive intersubjective relations as both external, in so far as
they mirror the relations of bodies, and internal, in so far as they allow
for our  intentional  containment  in one another.9 These tensions are
what Hegel’s theory aims to resolve – without success, according to
Sartre, and in a way that brings to light their specific irresolvability.
3. Sartre’s critique of Hegel’s intersubjectivism
Sartre’s discussion of Hegel begins at a point where he takes himself to
have  demonstrated  the  inadequacy  of  «classical»  accounts  of
knowledge of other minds, namely those of realism and idealism, and
also of  Husserl’s  account of  intersubjectivity,  which he  describes  as
having failed  to  make  any real  advance  beyond Kant.  From this  it
might  have  been  expected  that,  following  the  historical  sequence,
Sartre would proceed next to Heidegger, but instead he turns to Hegel,
whom he considers the first  to have grasped the true «ontological»
character  of  intersubjectivity,  though not  in  a  correct  form.  Sartre’s
treatment is dense and intricate, and I will attempt to reconstruct his
critical  argument independently from the  positive  theses  which are
also woven into his discussion.10
Though  Sartre  presents  his  critique  of  Hegel  in  the  form  of  a
9 BN 298-9/359-61.
10 The portion of the text in question is BN 235-44/291-300. Note that, if Hegel’s account
fails, Heidegger’s Mitsein – which in one respect aggravates Hegel’s defectiveness – offers
no alternative (BN 244-50/301-7, 413-29/484-502). 
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«twofold charge of optimism», «epistemological» and «ontological».11
This  may  suggest  that  Hegel’s  account  is  to  be  criticised  in  two
different respects, the first of which has to do with knowledge of other
minds.  It  is  better  viewed however as  a single argument in several
stages, none of which involve questioning the possibility of knowing
another’s  mental  states.  In  the  first,  preliminary  stage,  Sartre
challenges  Hegel’s  assumption  that  intersubjectivity  can  be
understood in terms of cognition. In the second, Sartre fixes on Hegel’s
concept of reciprocal recognition, which, Sartre argues, both specifies
what is required for the intelligibility of intersubjectivity, and shows
why it cannot be supplied. The third stage seeks to confirm the aporia
by  arguing  that  Hegel’s  intersubjectivism  presupposes  the
metaphysical holism of his Logic. I will take them in turn.
(1) Sartre begins with the assertion that Hegel undermines his own
achievement  – grasping intersubjectivity ontologically – by
subordinating the «relation of being» of self and other to a «relation of
knowledge»:12 Hegel  represents  intersubjective  relations  as  if  their
essence were exhausted by the shared conceptual representations that
we form of  them. This  assumption is  rejected by Sartre  not  simply
because it is idealistic,13 but on the grounds that, in the present context
in a way that  is  not  true of  others,  knowledge necessarily modifies
being: in becoming conscious of the other, I do not simply add to my
doxastic  stock,  rather  I  am  necessarily  altered in  respects  that  go
beyond cognition. Intersubjective relations involve, Sartre claims, the
production  of  new kinds  of  objects  and  properties,  to  which  new
relations  are  required,  and  of  which  the  self  must  try  to  achieve a
certainty  not  afforded  immediately  by  the  new entities  themselves.
Intersubjectivity thus sets self-consciousness a task, one which, for all
that  Hegel  is  entitled  to  suppose  at  the  relevant  point  in  his
Phenomenology,  there  is  no  a  priori guarantee  of  its  being  able  to
11 BN 240/296.
12 BN 240-1/296-7.
13 Though also for that reason: «consciousness is before being known» (BN 241/297).
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complete.  There  would  be  reason  to  think  that  knowledge  of
intersubjectivity can catch up with its being, and secure their harmony,
only if there were reason to think that the new ontological dimensions
of  plural  self-consciousnesses  necessarily  cohere  in  a  single  “social
reality”. That this is so is assumed by Hegel, but without justification:
In celebrating the new logical moment of Geist, Hegel grasps correctly
that thought and being are interrelated in the social sphere in a way
that they are not in our cognition of nature, since in intersubjectivity
the object of knowledge is itself a knower, which knows itself as (known
to be) a knower. To be sure,  this implies a potential infinity of new
relations,  but  all  that  we are entitled to assert  of  them is  that  they
concern a  new «dimension of  being» of  self-consciousness,14 a  new
realm  of  objects  and  properties  exhibiting  an  original  type  of
complexity.  Whether  they  also  constitute  an  intelligible  reality  is  a
further and separate matter, which we cannot be allowed to decide by
direct appeal to absolute idealism.
I  describe  this  argument as merely  preliminary,  since it  only lays
down the terms of Sartre’s challenge. Even if Hegel cannot assume the
identity  of  the  epistemological  and  ontological  aspects  of
intersubjectivity,  it  may  still  be  asked  why  the  possibility  of  their
rational coordination should be positively in doubt. The second stage
of Sartre’s argument is designed to answer this question.
(2) Hegel, following Rousseau and Fichte, sees that, if intersubjective
relations are not to shrink to relations to mere objectivity, then they
must  retain  the  essential  character  (whatever  it  may  be)  of  self-
relations,  whatever  other  dimensions  they  may  also  involve.  The
question is how this possible – or, more pointedly, how it can  not  be
impossible (since, on the face of it, the only thing that can grasp itself
as related to itself is precisely a self). Because natural consciousness has
no  answer,  philosophical  construction  is  necessary.  Hegel  proposes
accordingly that intersubjective relations are possible in so far as they
are  reciprocally  recognitive.  Such  relations  are  not  cases  of  mere
14 BN 268/326-7.
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duplication or mirroring – i.e., merely relations to another  instance of
the  kind  of  thing  that  I  am,  or  to  a  mere  image of  my  I-in-its-
particularity  –  rather  they  consist,  according  to  Hegel,  in  a
recuperation or restoration of selfhood. To the question, What is a self,
such that it is open to the possibility of «finding itself in another»?,
Hegel  has  an  answer:  Individual  self-consciousness  is  deficient in
«truth» in a way which makes possible both the initial movement of
self-alienation  which  reciprocal  recognition  presupposes,  and  the
restoration itself. The merely formal emptiness which comprises the
deficiency  of  self-consciousness,  on  Hegel’s  account,  is  what
dialectically compels the individual into sociality.15 
Sartre  agrees  with  Hegel  both  that  a  speculative  grounding  of
natural consciousness is needed if its commitments are to be shown to
be  consistent,  and  that  individual  self-consciousness  is  deficient.16
However,  the  latter  presupposition,  though  necessary  for  Hegel’s
recognitive solution, is also its undoing. If self-identity («existing in its
truth»)  is  missing  from  pre-intersubjective  self-consciousness,  then
intersubjectivity  cannot  supply  it,  for,  whatever  the  rewards  of
intersubjectivity may be,  selfhood cannot be one of  them, since  for
15 E.g., Hegel, Encyclopaedia Philosophy of Mind, §§424-5.
16 Sartre’s reasons for thinking that self-consciousness is defective are not Hegel’s, and on
his  account,  what  is  defective  in  self-consciousness  not  only cannot  be  remedied by
intersubjectivity but in fact entails the impossibility of intersubjective realization; see BN
298-302/360-3.  The  difference  may  be  put  by  saying  that,  whereas  for  Hegel  the
defectiveness  of  pre-intersubjective  self-consciousness  consists  merely  in  the  purely
formal character of its self-identity – its lack of determinacy – Sartre understands it as a
formal defect: because the subject is always still occupied with the (uncompletable) task of
becoming reflexive and is always  striving to achieve self-identity, which it never comes
into possession of (each is «perpetually a reference to a  self which it  has to be»,  BN
241/298), it is in no position to project its reflexivity out into the intersubjective arena; it
cannot  lend  to  being-with-others  what  it  does  not  have.  If  it  sought  to  (re)discover
“itself” in intersubjectivity, it would first need to abandon the task which constitutes it,
i.e., cease to be. In one regard Sartre agrees with Hegel regarding the mirroring of self-
consciousness  in  intersubjectivity:  consciousness  of  being-with-others  –  of  its  formal
failure  –  underlines and  reexpresses my  own  failure  to  achieve  self-identity  and  the
absolute limit that this sets on the kinds of relations that I can form with the Not-I. (I
present Sartre's critique of Hegel, however, without reliance on his theory of the self's
original defectiveness).
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Hegel,  as  for  Fichte,  the form in  terms of  which self-consciousness
must understand itself is that of self-identity, «I = I»,17 and grasping
oneself  in  the  shape  of  an  identity  is  incompatible  with  grasping
oneself as the effect of any composite cause. If, alternatively, what we
ordinarily  call  selfhood  is  a  condition  available  only  to
intersubjectively embedded beings, and to which they can lay claim
only on the  strength of  their  intersubjectivity,  then intersubjectivity
does not have the character that natural  consciousness supposes.  In
any case, if this is Hegel’s view, then his true claim is not, as it initially
seemed to be, that in intersubjectivity self-consciousness finds its own
reflexivity  projected  outwards  onto  a  larger  but  still  self-enclosing
canvas,  but  rather  that  intersubjective  reality  comprises  an  original
whole,  which  may presuppose  individual  self-consciousness  in  the
same  weak  sense  as  self-consciousness  presupposes  existence  as  a
natural  organism,  but  the  true  constituents  of  which  are  not  the
individual self-consciousnesses with which his  story began. On this
model,  pre-intersubjective self-consciousness cannot be said to  enter
into intersubjectivity,  but  only  to  provide  materials  out  of  which
intersubjectivity creates new entities, which supplant it.
The  problem  is  not  removed  by  positing  a  logically
contemporaneous  coming-into-being  of  intersubjective  reality  and
individual  self-consciousnesses.  This  would  accord  with  natural
consciousness by dint of reproducing its commitments, while doing
nothing to elucidate them. If anything, the difficulty would then be
aggravated, for if the complex structure “self and other as constellated
in a non-aggregative unity” is ultimate, then intersubjectivity involves
a superimposition of two modes of self-consciousness – consciousness
of  oneself  as  two  different  types of  entity,  the  one  enjoying
independence from intersubjectivity and the other enclosed within it –
without  any  possibility  of  insight  into  their  ground  or  systematic
integration.  The  complexity  of  the  contemporaneity  model,  once
internalized  by  individual  self-consciousness,  as  intersubjectivity
requires, becomes a lack of coherence within it.
17 BN 235/291, 239/295.
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The  dilemma  which  stands  at  the  core  of  Sartre’s  anti-
intersubjectivism  can  now  be  spelled  out.  (1)  If  the  relata of
intersubjective  relations  are  self-identical  selves,  then  they  are
(monadically) closed in a way that is, of course, compatible with their
entering into certain sorts of (limited) relations with one another, but
incompatible with their mutual intentional containment, and with the
supra-relational reality of intersubjectivity. (2) If,  on the other hand,
the  relata lack  self-identical  selfhood,  then  intersubjectivity  cannot
supply  it,  and  whatever  entities  intersubjectivity  may  give  rise  to
cannot  grasp  themselves  as  enjoying  the  independence  which  is
necessary  for  intersubjectivity  to  constitute  a  field  in  which  they
participate.  Stated  differently,  the  «circuit  of  selfness»  disclosed  in
reflection to each subject18 needs to run  through relations to others if
intersubjective relations are not to be merely relations to contents of
the world; but no entity which grasps itself as individuated by means
of this circuit can intelligibly abstract it from the context of reflection
in such a way as to reinstall it outside themselves. Hegel’s concept of
reciprocal  recognition appears  in  this  light  a  product  of  conflicting
vectors  in  natural  consciousness’  conception  of  intersubjectivity:  it
expresses the form that a solution would need to take, but the concept
provides  no  actual  solution,  merely  encapsulating  the  conflicting
demands placed upon philosophical theory by natural consciousness.19
If  this  is  correct,  then Sartre’s  argument  is  independent  of  quasi-
Cartesian assumptions to  the  effect  that  (to  take  some of  the more
obvious candidates, cited in criticism of Sartre20) (i) object- and subject-
18 BN 102-4/146-9, 150-8/196-205, 239/295.
19 It is instructive at this point to consider Honneth’s Hegelian critique of Sartre, which
turns on the claim that the meagreness of Sartre’s basic ontology leads him to under-
describe the actual rich phenomenology of recognitive consciousness (HONNETH 1995). If,
however, Sartre’s challenge is pitched at the fundamental level that I suppose, this does
not meet it: Sartre grants the phenomenological veracity of the Hegelian conceptualization
while disputing its Hegelian  ontological interpretation. (Of course, a general issue lurks
here.  On  my  account  (2010),  Sartre’s  metaphysical  reach  extends  beyond
phenomenological characterization; this is needed if the ordinary is to be revised. Cf.
MULHALL 2013 and MORRIS 2015.)
20  E.g., HONNETH 1995, 161-2.
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consciousness are metaphysically repugnant, or (ii) that the essentially
practical  character of the self-relation cannot be integrated with the
essentially theoretical character of our relation to others, or (iii) that
intersubjective relations are riven by an insurmountable dichotomy of
intuition and concept, or (iv) that the reality of the Other presupposes
an  impossible  sublation  of  the  distinction  of  facticity  and
transcendence, or, finally, (v) that the absolute freedom of the for-itself
is  necessarily antagonistic  to the reality of the Other.  These are not
altogether  false trails,  since  each represents  a consideration that,  in
some form, plays some role at some point in Part Three of  Being and
Nothingness,  but  none are the motor of  the present  argument.  Thus
while it is of course true that Sartre regards the problem of the Other
as bound up with his  comprehensive dualism of being-in-itself  and
being-for-itself, this general metaphysical duality is not responsible for
the aporeticity of intersubjectivity; the «scandal» of intersubjectivity is
a further «event», over and above the  surgissement of being-for-itself.
Similarly,  Sartre’s  thesis  of  the  immiscibility  of  subject-  and object-
consciousness is not the source of the aporia: Sartre dwells on the non-
objectifiability  of  interiority21 in  order  to  (a)  confute  an  important
subsidiary element in Hegel’s theory, his conception of Leben and self-
consciousness as able to form a transparent rational unity, (b) defend
his  own,  previously  articulated,  conception  of  intersubjective
cognition, and (c) bring to light the positive forces which obstruct even
a  contingent  harmony  of  the  epistemological  and  ontological
dimensions of intersubjectivity.
(3) What I am calling the third stage of Sartre’s argument corresponds
to what he calls the charge of «ontological optimism».22 It focuses on
the  Phenomenology’s  argument  for  the  necessity  of  intersubjectivity,
which is revealed to be methodologically ambiguous and ultimately
dependent on Hegel’s Logic.
The  Phenomenology invites,  on  the  one  hand,  an  interpretation
21 BN 240-3/296-9.
22 BN 243-4/299-300.
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according to which self-consciousness functions as the central node of
intelligibility,  the  point  at  which  object-consciousness  has  been
understood, and the basis of all  that follows, giving Hegel’s overall
argument in that work the shape of an “X”: the diverse components of
objective knowledge come to a head in the “I”, which then expands
into progressively comprehensive circles of spirit. This construal opens
Hegel, as we have seen, to Sartre’s objection that self-consciousness in
its  first  capacity does not secure its  second, for understanding it  as
having a  world,  practically and/or theoretically,  does  not  suffice  to
explain its supposed capacity to transcend itself into intersubjectivity.
It  might  be  proposed  that  this  move  can  be  validated  if  we
understand Hegel’s  theory  of  intersubjectivity  as  a  development  of
Fichte’s,  in  the  following  way.  What  Fichte  aims  to  show  in  his
Foundations of Natural Right is that the experience of recognition by the
Other – their «summons to activity», which leads me to posit myself as
a member of a community of rational beings – is a strict condition of
self-consciousness. For, Fichte argues, it is only by being determined to
self-determine  that  I  can  come  to  know  myself  as  self-active  and,
thereby, come to be presented to myself as an object in the way that I-
consciousness demands.23 Hegel can be interpreted as following out a
direct  implication  of  this  account  which  Fichte’s  exclusively  first-
personal philosophical  method leads him to overlook:  If  I  need the
Other to issue me with a summons, then the Other who summons me
also  needs  me to  summon  them;  so  either  the  process  cannot  get
started, for want of a unitary transcendental ground, or it can do so
only by virtue of some antecedent ground irreducible to individual
self-consciousness.24 Hegel’s claim would accordingly be – in line with
the holist trajectory of the  Phenomenology,  and as on other occasions
where reflection on the purported individuation of entities reveals a
greater  underlying  whole  –  that  self-consciousness  resolves  itself
“upwards” into a reality that contains it as a part.
23 FICHTE 2000 [1796-97], §§1-4 (‘First Main Division: Deduction of the Concept of Right’).
24 In GARDNER 2005, 237-40, I suggested that this consideration brings Sartre into line with
Fichte (though not Hegel). This now seems to me too quick.
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On this construal of Hegel’s intersubjectivism, it would support, not
presuppose,  his  metaphysical  holism.  The  problem,  however,  is
evident. Even if Fichte’s transcendental argument succeeds, and even
if it implies (as just argued) a further trans-subjective ground, Hegel’s
conclusion has still not been secured, for what has been shown is only
that  something  or  other initiates  the  «scandal  of  plural  self-
consciousnesses»,  not  that this  indeterminately conceived ground  is
the  «We»;  to  suppose  so  is  to  read  back  into  the  origin of
intersubjectivity what is only conceived through it.25
Now what  would validate the transition is a different interpretation
of the argument, which Hegel also seems to invite, according to which
a  constant  conceptual  form  repeats  itself  at  each  point  of  Gestalt-
reconfiguration,  and  logically  compels  consciousness’  forward
movement – the form described by Hegel, on the occasion of its first
appearance, as a «movement» in which the «immediately simple» is
first sublated in an other, and then restored as something «reflected
into itself».26 On this reading, which makes the Phenomenology in effect
an  application  of  the  Logic,  the  same  general  type of  necessity  as
transforms sense-certainty into perception, and that in later chapters
carries spirit through the various transformations which terminate in
absolute spirit, is  also and  equally what raises I-consciousness to We-
consciousness.27
This bypasses Sartre’s criticism in one respect, while leaving Hegel
exposed in another.  If  a certain  conceptual form is what supplies the
25 See Sartre’s discussion of the «metaphysical» question, «Why are there Others?», BN 297-
302/358-64.
26 PS §107/III:89.
27 Weight can be lent to this interpretation by attending to the course of Chapter IV and
what follows in the Phenomenology. Contra Rousseau and Fichte, Hegel denies that the We
is immediately realizable in reciprocal recognition, since his proclamation that Geist has
made  its  appearance  (PS  §177/III:145)  is  followed  directly  by  the  master/servant
dialectic. In so far as intersubjectivity begins in this asymmetry, Hegel may be thought to
accept, at this initial point, the break of intelligibility between I and We asserted by Sartre.
In other words, Hegel knows that the problem of intersubjectivity is insoluble with the
resources at hand. The redirection of the enquiry in the second half of Chapter IV into
stoicism and other ideologies of servile self-consciousness supports this construal. On
this interpretation, Hegel’s reply to Sartre’s objection is therefore, as indicated, that it is
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relevant  dynamic,  it  must  nonetheless  be  thought  to  have  worked
through individual self-consciousnesses (since it cannot be thought to
have coerced them externally) – in which case, it has still be explained
how an individual self-consciousness can relate (subordinate?) itself to
the conceptual form, which ex hypothesi cannot be simply “the form of
self-consciousness”. Sartre’s dilemma thus returns in modified form: If
the  conceptual  form  adduced  by  Hegel  is  exemplified  in  self-
consciousness, then it must  consist in (the form of) selfness, for self-
consciousness has no other form; if not, then its relation to selfness can
only be external, and intersubjectivity, even if it does not destroy the
subject’s reflexivity, cannot give it new reality.
Sartre’s  criticism  of  the  Phenomenology is  therefore  that  Hegel
exploits  an  ambiguity  between two ways –  the  one “Fichtean”,  the
other “Platonistic” or “logical” – of telling the story of the advance
from individual self-consciousness to intersubjectivity, in order to give
an  impression  of  continuous  intelligibility:  Hegel  presents  as  self-
consciousness’  own self-motivated  achievement,  a  change  of  shape
which in fact must be engineered from outside it. The Phenomenology
thus relies on the absolute idealism which it is supposed to be arguing
us into.28
If  Sartre  is  right  about  Hegel,  and  if  Hegel’s  theory  of
intersubjectivity  articulates  our  ordinary  conception  of
intersubjectivity, then this concept is defective not in the weak sense
only through a massive self-displacement, involving religion’s solution to the Unhappy
Consciousness, that self-consciousness can come to make intersubjectivity intelligible to
itself  –  and find itself  (when direct  discussion of  intersubjectivity  is  resumed at  the
beginning of the Spirit chapter) belonging to ethical substance, a member of a «living
ethical» world (PS §§437-40/III:  325-6).  Sartre can accept this  claim of  Hegel’s  if  it  is
understood  in  conditional  form:  only  if I  were  capable  of  becoming  God,  could  I
understand myself as belonging essentially to a We. (The issues raised here are endlessly
complex and I  am seeking not  to  defend the “logical”  interpretation,  but  merely to
indicate  how  it  serves  Sartre  in  his  dispute  with  Hegel.  For  an  account  of  the
Phenomenology that limits self-consciousness to an epistemological  means by which we
arrive at a monistic ontology, see HORSTMANN 2006.)
28 Hegel «places himself at the vantage point of truth – i.e., of the Whole – to consider the
problem of the Other»: if he resolves it so easily, «it is because for him there never has
been any real problem in this connection» (BN 243/299-300).
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that it mistakes the properties of its object, but in the strong sense that
the  concept  lacks  objective  reality  a  priori.29 In  Kantian  terms,  the
transcendental logic of intersubjectivity proves to be a dialectic, not an
analytic.30 Yet Sartre can hardly wish to be understood as saying that
what  is  taken  to  be  the  domain of  the  manifold  of  individual  self-
consciousnesses in their projects of interrelation is  empty – it is, after
all, his own claim that this field exhibits its own specific pattern of non-
coherence,  which  differentiates  it  from  others  and  shapes  the
phenomena  that  populate  it.  How,  then,  should  we  think  of
intersubjectivity, according to Sartre: can it be conceptualized positively,
i.e.,  as  anything  more than  a  projected  but  unrealizable  object  of
natural consciousness?
The new concept which Sartre introduces, in language intended to
counter  Hegel,  is  that  of  «detotalized  totality».31 Now  the  obvious
objection suggests  itself,  that,  in  order  for  there  to  be a  detotalized
totality, there must once have  existed a  totality,  if not in time then in
some other order, in the same way that the fragments of a broken vase
imply a former vase. Sartre must of course deny this, since it amounts
to a reinstatement of Hegel’s position on the basis that, even if present
conditions  fall  short,  the  possibility  of  actualizing  the  concept  is
guaranteed (the pieces give evidence, as it were,  that a vase can be
constructed from them).
The following shows how Sartre may meet the objection. In general,
attempts to conceptualize the impossible result, on the one hand, in
formulae  that  appear  to  refer  to  impossibilia –  “Square  circles  are
29 Similarly,  according  to  Sartre,  there  is  no  such  thing  as  “the  mind”,  as  ordinarily
conceived. The reality of each individual for-itself is the reality of its consciousness, and
when consciousness represents itself to itself as what Sartre calls a psyche, this entity is its
own fiction: see BN Pt. II, Ch. 2, Sect. III, 158-70/205-18 (summarized in GARDNER 2009,
117-22).
30 In  parallel  with  the  way  that  Kant’s  Paralogisms  of  Pure  Reason  show  the  non-
realizability of rational psychology’s Idea of the soul qua object of cognition, limiting self-
knowledge to transcendental apperception, Sartre shows the unrealizability of the “Idea”
of intersubjectivity. The comparison may be pursued: just as Kant grants the Idea of the
soul regulative significance, and objective reality for practical cognition, Sartre transfers
the “Idea“ of intersubjectivity into the practical context of social and political critique.
31 BN 252/309-10 and 299-302/360-4.
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geometrically impossible” – while also, at the same time, enabling the
formation of positive concepts, viz., of the attempts themselves: self-
stultifying acts, necessary performative failures – the thinking of “I do
not  exist”  or  “Nothing is  being thought”,  the  uttering of  “I  am not
speaking” or “I promise to break my promises” – are indexed by the
impossibilia which they invoke (but fail  to realize).  In the same way,
Sartre’s  «detotalized  totality»  can  be  understood  as  referring  to  a
sustained endeavour,  a  «project»,  which must end in self-stultification
but which has not yet come to its end, and to which existence must be
attributed in so far as each individual for-itself is necessarily conscious
of itself as engaged in this performance, and of each other for-itself as
also doing so.32 Now, if the manifold of for-itselves could be conceived
not merely  distributively but  collectively, then it could be urged at this
point, against Sartre, that objective reality can after all be given to the
concept of  their  totality,  simply by dint  of  its  grasping itself  as  such.
Again,  Hegel  would  then  be  vindicated,  for  the  «We»  would  have
posited itself into  existence, and Sartre’s «detotalized totality» would
have resolved itself into Hegelian spirit.  But if Sartre is right, this is
exactly  what  cannot  be  done,  since  the  possibility  of  the  collective
unity  of  the  manifold  of  for-itselves  which  this  Hegelian  story  of
objective  spirit’s  self-positing  presupposes  at  the  outset,  is  exactly
what needed to be established.
I acknowledged the elusiveness of Sartre’s insight and its liability to
aspect-switching.  More  may  now  be  said  about  this.  One  natural
response to Sartre is to wonder if he is not imposing, as necessary for
the intelligibility of intersubjectivity,  a condition which it is  logically
impossible  to  meet,  reducing  his  “aporia”  to  a  facile  paradox:  if
intersubjectivity requires the numerical identity of my “I” with your
“I”, or something equivalent, then it is of  course impossible. To the
extent  that  we start  with  our  actual  knowledge  of  intersubjectivity,
Sartre will inevitably seem to be making some such assumption. And
since  the  nub  of  his  argument  –  the  dilemma  he  presents  for
32 Sartre  of  course  freely  admits  such  entities  into  his  ontology;  the  for-itself  is a
contradictory project of seeking to become God.
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intersubjectivism – turns on a failure to make intelligible the transition
from individual self-consciousness  to intersubjectivity,  the reality of
the former remaining beyond doubt, Sartre appears to be asserting the
non-compossibility of self-consciousness and intersubjectivity: a claim
which, we infer, must rest on some positive doctrine which, whatever
it  may  be,  cannot  be  as  well  grounded  as  our  actual  common
knowledge  that  both  individual  self-consciousness  and
intersubjectivity enjoy reality. On this view, Sartre merely diverts us
from the truly purposive philosophical task at hand, of developing a
theoretical understanding of how exactly the two realities can co-exist,
a question which Hegel at least attempted to answer.
If the reconstruction presented earlier is correct, then this response
misconstrues Sartre (and thereby misses the opportunity to grasp the
deeply perplexing character of intersubjectivity, in the same way that
Fichte,  Henrich  shows,  reveals  what  is  deeply  puzzling  in  self-
consciousness). For Sartre does not deny that we are related to others
internally,  and  that  we  intentionally  contain  one  another:  on  the
contrary,  he  asserts  the  greatest  possible  intimacy with  the  Other’s
interiority  –  «there  is  a  sort  of  cogito concerning»  the  Other’s
existence.33 That intersubjectivity has reality in this sense is a premise
of his critique of Hegel and no more stands in doubt than do ordinary
plain  truths  concerning  the  social  properties  of  persons  and  other
social facts. Sartre’s thesis, rather, is that we have no insight into what
makes  this  situation  possible, and  his  argument  rests  only  on  the
assumption, which is present in natural consciousness and endorsed
by Hegel,  that the ground of intersubjectivity must  be accessible to
individual  self-consciousness.  This  is  where philosophical  reflection
comes to a halt, according to Sartre: self-consciousness cannot without
self-cancellation alienate  itself  in the  way needed to  rationalize  the
necessity of its relation to the Other.
It  is  reasonable  to  regard  Part  A  of  Chapter  IV  of  Hegel’s
Phenomenology  as seeking to give metaphysical  reality to Rousseau’s
33 See BN 251/308; discussed in GARDNER 2005, 326-33.
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problematic  conception  of  the  General  Will.34 Rousseau  offers  his
account as normative political theory, yet it is hard to reconstruct his
argument as a piece of strict contractarian reasoning, and if one thinks,
as Hegel no doubt does, that Rousseau is right that the problems of
normative political theory in general cannot be solved without delving
into  the  foundations  of  selfhood and relations  to  others  (in  a  way
which yields moreover a less methodologically individualistic outlook
than  Kant’s),  then  Hegel’s  endeavour  to  rationalize  Rousseau  is
strongly motivated. In Sartre’s terms, however, the familiar stumbling-
blocks of Rousseau’s political theory – how can I be forced to be free?
how can the General Will be my own will? – become the problem of
Hegel’s  metaphysics  of  intersubjectivity  –  how  can  I  be the  We?  –
meaning  that  Rousseau’s  problem,  of  grasping  how  it  might  be
possible for us to live together,  remains unsolved. To anticipate the
following section, we can now begin to see how Sartre’s aporetic thesis
might  have  a  positive  aspect,  for  if  taking  natural  consciousness’
conception of intersubjectivity at face value – construing the sum of its
commitments realistically and accordingly seeking their real ground –
fails  to  make  it  intelligible,  then  aporeticity  offers  itself  as  at  least
allowing natural  consciousness to sustain,  on a  non-realist  basis,  its
commitments  concerning  what  it  means  to  live  with-and-among
others.  The  insight  is  also  purgative,  for  once  illusions  of  essential
collectivity and foundational community have been eliminated, it is
seen that the only possible foundation of collective life is  solidarity, a
condition which is not given but which can be constructed, through a
self-overcoming  of  individual  subjectivity  motivated  not  by
considerations of utility but by affirmation of freedom as the Good.35
34 The problem emerges in the crucial sixth chapter of Book I of The Social Contract, when
Rousseau  advances  from  (i)  individuality  in  the  state  of  nature,  by  way  of  (ii)  an
«agrégation» of the forces of each, to (iii) a «forme d’association», in which (iv) each is
«partie indivisible du tout», (v) this «tout» being «la volonté générale». Granting that the
General  Will  is  necessary for  rational collective life,  what underpins this  movement?
Utility, or non-fulfilment of need, is not a sufficient explanation.
35 The «absolute conversion to intersubjectivity» (SARTRE 1992 [1947-48], 406-7, 479) which
yields solidarity with others, is Sartre’s version of Rousseau’s social contract.
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4. Sartre’s social theory
I  noted  at  the  beginning  that  Sartre’s  conception  of  aporetic
intersubjectivity is associated with a pessimistic account of personal
relationships, and the text of  Being and Nothingness leaves little doubt
that, in 1943, Sartre is heavily preoccupied with the sphere of intimate
relations; the concrete practical and axiological upshot of the aporetic
character  of  intersubjectivity,  he  explains,  is  that  attempts  to  form
purposive relations with others, even if they do not in fact come to
grief, are essentially empty. The broader implications for ethical and
political thought appear plainly nihilistic or at best Hobbesian. Marxist
and other critics have hurried to point out the evident disputability of
Sartre’s (“bourgeois individualistic”) assumption that dyadic personal
relationships  are  ontologically  and  hermeneutically  independent  of
broader social, historical and material structures – entities which, they
argue, display a robust degree of reality, and attention to which gives
us reason to reject the anti-intersubjectivism of Being and Nothingness.
Against this assessment, I suggest that, though Being and Nothingness
may  seem  to  close  philosophical  enquiry  into  intersubjectivity,  the
Critique of Dialectical Reason represents a continuous development of
Sartre’s earlier thought with respect to this topic,36 in so far as Sartre
discovers  a  constructive  use  for  his  earlier  aporetic  thesis  in
application to the social sphere, allowing him to appropriate the social
realism of  his  critics  on the  Left.  Properly substantiating this  claim
would  require  a  lengthy  discussion,  but  some  things  can  be  said
briefly to make it plausible.
It quickly becomes clear to readers of the Critique that Sartre regards
social  ontology  as  at  once  problem  and  solution,  explanandum and
explanans.37 Theoretical problems of understanding history and society
36 The standard view, by contrast, is that Sartre makes philosophical progress to the extent
that he deserts his early anti-intersubjectivism; e.g., HONNETH 1995, 166-7.
37 Central passages are in part II of the Introduction, and in Bk. I, Ch. 1, of the Critique of
Dialectical  Reason.  I  am  of  course  not  offering  here  a  summary  of  the  Critique;  my
suggestion is just that the aporeticity of intersubjectivity is the precondition of its major
Metodo Vol. 5, n. 1 (2017)
Sartre's Original Insight                                                                                69
have  their  solution  in  grasping  the  peculiarly  problematic  kind  of
existence possessed by social  entities,  and this  mode of existence is
also the ultimate source of the problems of actual social and political
existence:  it  mediates  the  factual  causes  of  political  conflict  and
domination,  making  them  occasions  for  the  irruption  of  a
metaphysical  problem  underlying  collective  life,  and  lending  them
forms that make them resistant to rational solution. Thus for Sartre the
decisive role reserved by classical  liberal  theory for individual self-
interest,  and by marxist  theory for  material  factors,  is  taken  by  an
ontological  structure,  which subsumes  them:  the  Sartrean problem,
concerning  the  heterogeneous  types  of  existence  exemplified  by
individual subjects and by social realities, is what threatens to make
the (familiar, manifest) problems of conflicts of interest and material
scarcity insoluble, and sets human history in motion – which, if it has a
meaning, must lie in the resolution (in some sense that, Sartre is well
aware,  has  yet  to  be  specified)  of  the  original  aporia  of
intersubjectivity.
What  allows  Sartre  to  go  on  to  raise  questions  concerning  the
conditions  of  rational  sociality  and  the  total  meaning  of  human
history, without executing a metaphilosophical volte face, is essentially
straightforward.  It  turns  on  a  notion  which  had  already  been
introduced in Part Two of Being and Nothingness, though not expanded
on.  Having  argued  that  individual  mindedness  consists  in
consciousness  grounded  on  freedom,  which  misrepresents  itself  as
sharing  in  the  unfree  mode  of  being  of  the  in-itself,  Sartre
acknowledges  that  the  «psychic  facts»  into  which  consciousness
degrades  itself,  once  they  have  been  constituted,  acquire  a  quasi-
reality; they are derivative and virtual, but not abstract or illusory.38
Being-for-itself thereby surrenders to what is,  in terms of origin, its
own fiction. In the Critique of Dialectical Reason Sartre turns to examine,
as Being and Nothingness had only begun to do,39 the quasi-autonomous
innovations  –  the  «practico-inert»,  the  role  of  scarcity,  the  shift  to  ternary  relations,
intersubjectivity’s mediation by «things», and so on.
38 BN 158-9/205-6, 161-3/208-11, 170/218.
39 In the section on the «We»: BN Pt. III, Ch. 3, Sect. 3.
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life of these pseudo-realized fictions, in order to lay bare their specific
logic, which is inadequately grasped in the respectively idealistic and
materialistic dialectics of Hegel and Marx. The failure of subjects to
cohere intelligibly renders human reality ontologically vulnerable: it
defines an empty space into which the entities which give the social
and historical  world its  pseudo-substantiality project  themselves.  In
this way the aporetic thesis provides the key to the new forms of social
and historical explanation explored in Sartre’s Critique.
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